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Abstract  
This paper proposes a two-stage game theoretic model in which the discretionary power of 
executives acts as an implicit defense against hostile takeovers. Following managerial enterprise 
models, this paper analyzes the effects of target’s executives’ discretionary power over R&D and 
advertising in defeating hostile takeover attempts. It is shown that in vertically differentiated 
industries, in equilibrium, target’s executive keep low level of R&D and advertising to make 
their firm an unattractive target for hostile takeovers. The model reveals that the executives are 
influenced by their self-interest of monetary and non-monetary benefits and this self-interest 
behavior makes the industry less differentiated. Additionally, the firm’s takeover (hostile or 
friendly) is endogenously determined by the executives.   
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1. Introduction 
Hostile takeover of firms are not new in corporate world, in UK during the period 1991-
97, hostile takeover bids covers around 16.5% of total bids for public companies (Deakin, Hobbs 
and Singer, 2001).The unprecedented economic recession which began in the first quarter of 
2001 raises the number of such takeovers. Value of these takeovers in US was around $95 billion 
in 2001 which is more than double the value in 2000, and almost $15 billion more than in 1988 
(Thorton,2002).The crises had motivated the industry leaders to acquire their rivals as a 
corporate growth strategy. Firms’ having adequate cash reserves or borrowing capability initiated 
the forcibly acquisition of others at discounted prices. As a consequence, distressed firms’ 
became more vulnerable to hostile takeovers attempts. However, favorable conditions were 
restored in 2004 the hostile takeover attempts didn’t take off. In year 2006, more than 100 hostile 
transactions, valued at over $520 billion, were announced around the world (Ruud, Näs, and 
Tortorici, 2007).Indeed, the picture of hostile takeovers is more or less similar in other countries 
too. 
 Hostile takeovers are public offer of specific price, usually a substantial premium over 
the prevailing market price of stocks. It allows the bidders to seek control directly from the 
shareholders by going ‘over-the-heads’ of target’s executive team. In contrast to friendly 
takeovers, where the bidder’s proposal receives a positive reaction from the target’s executive 
team because it need to be approved by executives, hostile bids are unsolicited offers that 
challenge the strategic direction and leadership of the company (Pearce II and Robinson, 
2004).On the consequence side, successful hostile takeover replaces the target’ executive team 
by a new and efficient team [Franks and Mayer (1987), Krug (2003)].  
The executive’s legal obligation is to get a good deal for shareholders, which often means 
supporting the hostile takeovers. However, executives’ self-interest is to save his job and non-
monetary benefits (i.e. number of staff, security, power, status & prestige) which he often looses 
after his firm’s hostile takeover. A target’s executive faces the dilemma of choosing between 
self-interest or shareholders interest in hostile takeovers attempts. If the incentives are not 
perfectly aligned with those of shareholders, they would be tempted to oppose the hostile 
takeover attempts. According to Jensen and Mechkling (1976), in such situations where his self-
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interest is more influencing then shareholder’s interest, executive will follow his self-interest. 
Defeating the hostile takeovers attempts also opens the option for friendly takeover where they 
apparently retain their job, non-monetary benefits and get a share in firm’s ownership 
(stock).Aveni and Kenser (1993) examined that in friendly takeovers executives cooperate with 
the bidder for their job, non-monetary benefits and share in ownership. 
 Target’s executives have access to a variety of explicit defensive tactics to defeat hostile 
takeovers (Gaugan,2007).The array includes charter amendment, poison pills golden parachute, 
litigation, green mail and standstill agreements and many more( Pearce II and Robinson,2004). 
Although these defenses are effective in delaying the hostile takeovers but they are rarely enough 
to keep the target away from the fear of hostile takeover attempts. Bidder’s motivation for 
attempting the hostile takeover is backed by higher profit earnings by expanding the product 
breadth and customer base. Similarly, the motivation for accepting the hostile takeover by 
target’s share holders is to get a higher premium over the market prices of stock. Therefore, if the 
gains from the hostile takeover are less for the bidder he will give up his attempt or if the 
premiums are lower target’s shareholders will be reluctant to accept the hostile takeover offer.  
This relationship (takeover gains/premiums with hostile takeovers) is the subject matter 
of this paper. More specifically, the purpose is to explore how executives are exploiting it to 
fulfill their self-interest. A two stage game theoretic model is constructed to show that when 
firms are competing in vertically differentiated industries, target’s executives use their 
discretionary power over R&D and advertising to lower the gains and premiums accrue to 
bidders and target’s shareholders, respectively. As a result, they defeat the hostile takeover 
attempt of their firm. Additionally, this behavior will make the industry less differentiated and 
the choice of takeover (hostile or friendly) becomes an endogenous decision. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted for the review of related literature, followed 
by the description of model in section 3 and finally we conclude in the last section.   
2. Related Literature 
 The area of hostile takeovers has been extensively explored in past years. Researchers 
have developed a number of arguments for such activity including the existence of synergy or 
economies of scale and disciplining the executives. The synergy motive occurs because of 
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economic gains that result by merging the resources of two firms. Berkowitch and 
Narayan(1993) examine the synergy motives of takeovers using 330 hostile takeovers  made 
during 1963-1988 and found that there is a positive correlation between takeover target and total 
gains. On the disciplinary role of takeovers, Grossman and Hart (1980) argued that when a firm’s 
environment changes, the relationship between shareholders and executives becomes obsolete. 
Executives get the opportunity to transfer some value to themselves. Hence, takeovers improve 
efficiency of executives by enabling a third party (bidder) to take control of the firm. According 
to Manne (1965), a takeover provides assurance of competitive efficiency among executives and 
thus saves the interests of scattered shareholders. Morck  et. al. (1989) in their analysis of 425 
public trades firms found that hostile takeover attempts are motivated by the gains associated 
with disciplining poorly performing executives. Samuelson (1970) in his seminal work 
mentioned that takeovers are nature’s method of eliminating deadwood in firm’s survival 
struggle. 
In the contrast of executive replacement hypothesis, considerable attention has devoted to 
the study of opposition by target’s executives to takeover attempts. Easterbrook and Fischel 
(1981) in their analysis find that executives resist hostile takeover attempt to preserve their firm’s 
independence and thus preserve their salaries and status. In light of own self-interest and 
shareholders interest in hostile takeover attempts, executive faces a dilemma of accepting or 
resisting the takeover. Jensen (1988), in his work argued that executive always follows their self 
interest. Additionally, executive’s self interest is not only limited to monetary benefit like salary 
and share in profits but also non-monetary benefits. Williamson (1963) stated that executive’s 
utility function includes the monetary benefits and non-monetary benefits, non-monetary or 
private benefits are material satisfaction and include number of staff, security, power, status, 
prestige and professional excellence. “with the expansion of staff, the expansion of physical plant 
and equipment provides general opportunities for managerial satisfaction” Williamson (1963). 
The evidence suggests that these benefits are lost by target’s executives after hostile 
takeovers because they are replaced by new and efficient team. For example, Franks and Mayer 
(1996) examine 33 successful hostile takeovers in the United Kingdom that were first announced 
during 1985 and 1986.They find that  hostile takeovers are associated with high executive 
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turnover,90% executives resigned after successful hostile takeover. Similarly, Krug(2003) in his 
research found that on average, about a quarter of the executives in acquired top management 
teams leave within the first year, additional 15% depart in the second year, roughly double the 
normal turnover rate. From this perspective, executive may prevent hostile takeover that would 
be profitable for shareholders if he expects to lose some of his rents and perquisites (Schnitzer, 
1996). 
Executive have several defenses against hostile takeovers like poison pills, corporate 
charter amendments ,golden parachutes, litigation, greenmail, standstill agreements and capital 
structure changes( for details see Gaugan,2007). PearceII and Robinson (2004) reviewed the 
effects of these defenses and concluded that only poison pills and litigation are likely to increase 
the shareholders wealth, effects of others are negative or negligible. However, all these defenses 
are confined to maximizing the shareholders interest and assume that executives are performing 
for the best of their shareholders. Jensen (1986) criticizes this assumption unrealistic and stated 
that executives always follow their self-interest rather than shareholders. Jarell also argued that 
these are explicit defenses and most of them are ineffective in eliminating the firm’s chances of 
takeover, these measures can only delay the takeover attempts and nothing else. Therefore, 
executives are motivated to look for some other defenses which are implicit in nature and more 
effective. 
 Marris (1963), in his model of managerial enterprise affirmed that managers have 
discretionary power over R&D and advertising expenditures along with the prices to maximize 
their firm’s rate of growth. R&D allows a firm to improve the quality (Deroian and Gannon, 
2006) by real change while advertising improves the quality imaginary, by changing the 
consumer preferences between the available brands (Bloch and Manceau, 1999). Additionally, in 
vertically differentiated industries, product differentiation is established through R&D or 
advertising activities (Motta, 1993).Therefore, we can say that in vertically differentiated 
industries, executives might use this discretionary power to defeat their firm’s hostile takeover 
attempt. Although available literature had extensively explored various defenses against hostile 
takeovers, but neglected the role of executive’s discretionary power over R&D and advertising. 
Harris and Raviv (1987) examined the effect of issuing high amount of debt in deterring the 
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takeover raid. Similarly , implementing the management  buyout is another example of saving 
the self-interest of target’s executive team (Shleifer and Vishney,1987) In contrast, this paper 
proposes a two-stage game theoretic model of executive discretion over R&D advertising in 
making the takeover type an endogenous decision (decided by the executives).  
3. The Model 
It is necessary to remark that this paper is mainly interested in the effects of executive’s 
discretion (R&D and advertising) in defeating hostile takeover attempts. We considered a two 
stage game in which it is assumed that, a priori, executives have discretionary power in choosing 
the quality of their products. They do it by adopting a level of R&D or advertising intensity and 
each firm knows its rival’s product quality. In the first stage, executives behave non-
cooperatively and choose the quality of their products. This establishes a level of quality 
(product) differentiation between their products. And in the second stage, given this level of 
quality differential, one of the firms decides to takeover his rival. Further, assume that the first 
takeover attempt is always hostile takeover and the failure in hostile takeover attempt will open 
other takeover option i.e. friendly takeover or no takeover. We will solve this game by the 
method of backward induction to find the equilibrium level of quality differential that minimizes 
the possibility of hostile takeover with minimum loss to executives.  
To develop the model we have followed some interesting aspects of the income and 
quality purchase models of Gabszewicz and Thisse(1979) and Shaked and Sutton(1982)1.To 
describe the model simply, suppose we have an industry with N number of firms, competing in 
qualities or more specifically the industry is vertically differentiated(differentiate their products 
in terms of quality). To avoid the complexities associated with cost it is assumed that the cost of 
production is zero. On demand side, consumers are heterogeneous i.e. different in their income 
level or willingness to pay, identified by their income θ  and they are uniformly distributed along 
the space [0, 1].Each consumer has its unique place in this space according to his income. 
Consumers may purchase either single unit of the product from one of the firms or none at all if 
                                                          
1
 Brief explanation is given in “The Theory of Industrial Organization” Jean Tirole (1989),The MIT press, page 296 
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prices are too high. The utility function for a consumer with [0,1]θ ∈  is ( )U s pθ θ= −  when he 
consumes a product of quality s at price p with given incomeθ .  
As a matter of fact, in differentiated product markets, there are always some consumers 
who are located at the extremes in the space [0, 1] see in figure 1.1. More specifically, because of 
the budget constraint or elite mindset they don’t have any incentive to tradeoff between income 
and quality. In other words, their elasticity of substitution between income and quality is either 
zero or infinite. These consumers are located at left (right) extreme part of the space and served 
by the firms producing products with inferior (elite) quality. Consumers whose income is  less 
than θ
 
 have the elasticity equal to infinite and income more than θ
 
have elasticity equal to 
zero. Between these two extremes, remaining market θ θ−  , where 2θ θ>  is covered by the 
n number of firms, competing in qualities. 
 
Figure 1.1: Distribution of consumers 
For simplicity, assume that there are only two firms 1Firm and 2Firm producing distinct, 
substitute goods in space [θ θ− ]. Firms are producing their products with a quality and price 
combination of 1 1( , )s p and 2 2( , )s p respectively where s is the quality index, 1 2s s<
 
and 
1 2( , ) [0,1]s s ∈ .There would be a consumer, who is indifferent between the products of firms, we 
denote this marginal consumer by its place in θ θ−  space byθɶ . This marginal consumer have 
the respective utility functions 1 1( )U s pθ θ= −ɶ ɶ  and  2 2( )U s pθ θ= −ɶ ɶ  for both the products at 
given prices, quality and income. By definition he satisfies 1 1s pθ −ɶ = 2 2s pθ −ɶ and solving the 
equality of these utility functions, income of this marginal consumer is: 
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2 1
2 1
                                       (1)p p
s s
θ −=
−
ɶ
 
Clearly, consumers having income ( )θ θ< > ɶ  will buy from 1Firm ( 2Firm ). 
Let,ε 2 1s s≡ − , which is a measure of quality differential between the firms products, a large ε  
indicates a large amount of differential. Any increase in quality due to the increase in R&D or 
advertising by 1Firm  (keeping s2 fixed) will decrease the ε .Thus, makes his product a close 
substitute of 2Firm ’s product i.e. low differentiation .However, increase in R&D or advertising 
by 2Firm  (keeping s1 fixed) will increase the ε  and consequently makes his product more 
unique i.e. high differentiation. Accordingly, with covered market assumption, the demand 
enjoyed by 1Firm and 2Firm are θ θ−ɶ  and θ θ− ɶ  respectively and their profits functions 
are 11 ( )p θ θ= −∏ ɶ  and 22 ( )p θ θ= −∏ ɶ .Then under Bertrand competition, profit maximization 
under non-cooperative behavior yields the following profits as a function ofε  (derivations are 
given in appendix A.1). 
2 2
1 2
1 1( ) ( 2 )    and    ( ) (2 )                             (2)
9 9
ε θ θ ε ε θ θ ε= − = −∏ ∏   
 
3.1 Solution of stage II 
Now let’s go to our takeover game, backward induction method implies that first we 
should consider the second stage of this game. With the given level of quality differentialε , 
bidder firm decides whether to attempt the hostile takeover or not. We solve this stage to find 
that at what level of ε  the target’s hostile takeover is possible. Let us assume that 2Firm  is 
interested in the hostile takeover of 1Firm , other way can also be possible. If the hostile takeover 
is not a possibility, then either 1Firm  will remain in operation or will initiate friendly takeover 
led by its executives. In friendly takeovers executives cooperate with the bidder for their job, 
non-monetary benefits and share in ownership (Aveni and Kenser, 1993).Hence, friendly or no 
takeover option will fulfill the executive’s self-interests. 
8 
 
After the successful hostile takeover of 1Firm , the profit level of 2Firm  would be 
2
2
1( )
4m
sε θ=∏  because now he is enjoying the monopoly in the space θ θ −  (see appendix 
A.2).The maximization problem is conceptually equivalent to the problem of a monopolist 
producing two different qualities (Hackner,1994).In result, he produces only one product with 
quality 2s . The net gain of 2Firm from this hostile takeover is the difference between the 
monopoly and the non-cooperative profits: 
2 2
2
1 1 (2 )                                   (3)
4 9
( ) sG θ θ θ εε = − −  
Higher gains would allow 2Firm  to  offer a higher premium to the shareholders of 1Firm , 
in excess of their stock prices. Getting higher prices on their stock would encourage the 
shareholders of 1Firm to sell their stocks to 2Firm .Thus, enhances the target’s possibility of 
hostile takeover.  
Proposition I: Takeover gains ( )G ε  are a function of quality differential ε  and there is a 
critical limit for hostile takeover, beyond this it is unprofitable to takeover the target. 
Proof : Hostile takeover of 1Firm  by 2Firm   is  only possible when the gains of 2Firm from this 
takeover is at least greater than zero, ( ) 0G ε > .Hence, for the critical limit of quality 
differentialε which determines hostile takeover of 1Firm , we should solve the following 
inequality.  
2 2
2
1 1 (2 )     0                                         (4)
4 9
>sθ θ θ ε− −  
Therefore, the critical level cε is equal to
2
2
2
9
4 (2 )
sθ
θ θ
 
 
− 
(details are given in appendix A.3). 2Firm  
will attempt the hostile  takeover of  1Firm  only when the given level of quality differential ε  is 
less than the critical level (ε < cε ) as shown in figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2: Hostile takeover as a function of ε  
 
3.2 Solution of stage I 
Since we got the possibility of firm’s hostile takeover (from stage II)  in terms of quality 
differentialε , we now move to the first stage of this game, in which the executives of 1Firm  
have a significant role to play. Here executives’ problem is to set of the level of quality 
differential which maximizes his self-interest. We assume that all executives have a homogenous 
utility function, to simplify the analysis further assume that there is only one executive in 1Firm . 
The utility function of this executive is 2
1
( ) ( ) (1 )U S Bε ψ ε ε= + + −∏  and it is characterized as 
a function of monetary benefits (fixed salary ( S ), fixed percentage (ψ ) in firm’s profits) and 
non-monetary benefits B  attained by them [ψ & B  >0].Accordingly, for the optimal level of 
quality differential Uε  he would maximize his utility function given in the below equation: 
2
1
max  ( ) (1 )                                     (5)S B
ε
ψ ε ε+ + −∏  
Solving the optimization problem in equation (5) gives the utility maximizing level of 
quality differential 21 ( 2 )
18U B
ψ θ θε  = −  
(derivation is given in appendix A.4).This is the first 
best choice that the executive would like to maintain in the industry (see in figure 1.3).  
10 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Utility maximizing level of ε   
 
Proposition II: The utility maximizing choice of quality differential Uε  is inversely related with 
the non-monetary benefits of executives. Any change in the non-monetary benefit (B) will change 
the choice of Uε .  
Proof: The first derivative of the optimal choice 21 ( 2 )
18U B
ψ θ θε  = −  
 w.r.t ε  is 
2
2
18 B
ψ θ θ −
−  
 
. The negative slope confirms that the utility maximizing quality differential 
choice Uε  is a decreasing function of  B. This implies that any change in non-monetary benefits 
will motivate the executives to distort their optimal level of quality differential ( Uε ). 
Figure 1.4 illustrates the equilibrium quality differential ( Eε ) of this two stage game. 
From the second stage of this game we derived the 1Firm ’s critical limit of being hostile takeover 
by 2Firm  , and the first stage focuses on the utility maximizing choice of quality differential. 
Executive’s objective is not limited in maximizing his utility function but also rule out his firm’s 
possibility of takeover. He can retain his job and enjoy other benefits only when his firm either 
implements friendly takeover or remain in industry. Therefore, the equilibrium choice of quality 
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differential is influenced by the firm’s possibility of hostile takeover. The following proposition 
describes the outcome from the perspective of target’s executive in maximizing his self-interest. 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Equilibrium outcome of the game 
 
 
Proposition III: (a) If u cε ε≥  the equilibrium level of quality differential ( mε  ) will be equal to 
                               the executive’s optimal choice Uε  . 
                          (b) If uε < cε   the equilibrium level of quality differential ( mε  ) will be equal 
                               to the critical level cε . 
         
Proof: Because the choice is now dependent on the possibility of staying in the target firm 
(minimizing the possibility of hostile takeover) executive would choose the level of quality 
differential by interacting his utility maximizing choice with the critical limit of being hostile 
takeover.C1 and C2 curves in figure 1.4 are the two utility curves showing the utility 
maximization choices. Executive knows that if his utility maximization choice ( 1U ) is greater 
than the critical limit ( cε ) his firm’s hostile takeover is zero. He doesn’t have any incentive to 
distort this level and hence he will keep this utility maximizing choice, equilibrium outcome is 
established at ( )m uε ε= . However, in cases when the utility maximizing choice ( 2U ) is less than 
the critical limit ( cε ) he would have strong incentive to distort it. At this choice ( 2U ), his firm is 
a good takeover target and therefore executive will spend less on R&D and adverting to increase 
the level of quality differential (ε )
 
, at least equal to the critical limit ( cε ). Distorting the 
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quality differential in the industry and setting it equal to the critical limit will makes his firm’s 
possibility of hostile takeover equal to zero. The equilibrium outcome will be established at the 
critical limit ( )c mε ε= .  
At last, whatever be the executive’s utility maximizing choice it is always greater than or 
equal to the critical limit and therefore, makes the industry more differentiated in terms of 
product’s quality. Moreover, since the executives have discretionary power over R&D and 
advertising expenditures and they use it as a defense against hostile takeover attempts, it can be 
said that the firm’s takeover type is endogenously determined. 
4. Conclusions: 
The top executive’s legal obligation is to get a good deal for shareholders, which often 
means allowing the hostile takeover of their firm. However, executive’s own interest is to save 
his job and the non-monetary benefits, which he often loses after a hostile takeover. Hence, due 
to this self-interest behavior executives are motivated to defeat their firm’s hostile takeover 
attempts. Apart from the explicit defensive tactics against the hostile takeovers, executives are 
utilizing their discretionary power over R&D and advertising expenditures as an implicit defense 
against hostile takeovers.  
This paper proposed a two-stage game theoretic model of a vertically differentiated 
industry, in the first stage, non-cooperative behavior of firms establishes the level of quality 
(product) differentiation between their products. And in the second stage, this level of quality 
differential determines the firm’s attempt to hostile takeover his rival. We find the solution of 
this game by backward induction method. The solution reveals that at equilibrium, executives are 
keeping low level of R&D and advertising to make their firm less attractive target for hostile 
takeover attempts. Moreover, executive’s self-interest behavior makes the industry more 
differentiated in quality and the firm’s takeover types either hostile or friendly is endogenously 
determined by the target’s executives. Validity of this model can be easily tested by using 
empirical data and econometric techniques. The model hypothesize that an increase in R&D and 
advertising expenditure tends to decrease the firm’s likelihood of hostile takeover but we leave it 
for future research. 
13 
 
 Appendix:  
A.1. Derivation of profits under Bertrand competition 
The demand enjoyed by 1Firm and 2Firm are θ θ−ɶ  and θ θ− ɶ  respectively and their profits 
functions are 11 ( )p θ θ= −∏ ɶ and 22 ( )p θ θ= −∏ ɶ , where 2 1p pθ ε
−
=
ɶ
.Then, individual firm’s 
profit maximization under Bertrand competition yields the following reaction functions. 
1 2 2
1( ) [ ]
2
p p p θε= −  2 1 1
1
and      ( ) [ ]
2
p p p θε= +  
 The equilibrium prices are 
  
1
1 ( 2 )
3
p θ θε= −
 2
1
and      (2 )
3
p θ θε= −
 
        
and the corresponding profits are 
2
1
1( ) ( 2 )
9
ε θ θ ε= −∏
 
2
2
1
and   ( ) (2 )
9
ε θ θ ε= −∏
 
 
      
A.2 Derivation of bidder’s profits after hostile takeover 
The maximization problem is conceptually equivalent to the problem of a monopolist producing 
two different qualities. Therefore, joint profits are  
1
1 2
1
( ) ( )m
pp p
s
θ θ θ∏ = − + −∑ ɶ ɶ
 
Setting the partial derivatives w.r.t. prices (p1 and p2) equal to zero yields the following 
corresponding prices. 
 
1 1
1
2
p sθ=
 
2 1
1
and     ( )
2
p sθ ε= +
 
and the profit is  
2
21
4m
sθ∏ =
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A.3 Critical level of quality differentiation for attempting the hostile takeover 
The hostile takeover is only profitable for the acquirer when the below given condition is 
satisfied. 
2 2
2
1 1 (2 )     0
4 9
>sθ θ θ ε− −
 
2 2
2
1 1Or       (2 )   
9 4
sθ θ ε θ− <  
Or 
2
2
2
9
 
4 (2 )
sθ
θ θ
ε  <  
− 
 
A.4 Manager’s utility maximizing choice of product differentiation 
Executive is facing the below given optimization problem, in which the level of quality 
differentiation is determined by his choice of product’s quality. 
2
1
max  ( ) (1 )S B
ε
ψ ε ε+ + −∏
 
Taking the derivative with respect to ε and setting it equal to zero yields the following first order 
condition. 
21 ( 2 ) 2 0
9
Bψ θ θ ε− − =
 
Thus, the executive’s self-interest maximizing level of quality differential is equal to   
21 ( 2 )
18u B
ψ θ θε  = −  
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